Michigan Law Review
Volume 54

Issue 1

1955

Constitutional Law - Due Process - Automatic and Permanent
Dismissal of Public School Teachers for Invoking the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination
John B. Huck S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Education Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John B. Huck S.Ed., Constitutional Law - Due Process - Automatic and Permanent Dismissal of Public
School Teachers for Invoking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 54 MICH. L. REV. 126 (1955).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/7

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

126

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Due Process -AUTOMATIC AND PERMANENT DISMISSAL OF PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS FOR INVOKING THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION-Petitioners, employed as public school teachers in
New York City, were subpoenaed to appear before a Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee. When questioned by the committee about communist
activities, petitioners asserted the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Pursuant to the New York City Charter,1 they were summarily
dismissed and permanently barred from re-employment by the city. No
hearing was required nor given prior to the dismissal. There was no evidence of conduct otherwise warranting a dismissal. In an action for
reinstatement, held, dismissal affirmed. Daniman v. Board of Education of
City of New York, 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E. (2d) 373, 307 N.Y. 806, 121 N.E.
(2d) 629 (1954), probable jurisdiction noted sub nom. Slochower v. Board
of Higher Education, 348 U.S. 935, 75 S.Ct. 356 (1955).
Recent affirmations of dismissals under similar circumstances2 sustain
the principle that public employees have no vested property right, nor
other constitutional right, to retain the "privilege" of public employment.3
The proprietary rights inherent in the field of public employment enable
states to act, in effect, like private employers in determining policies and
conditions for employment.4 The only limitation placed on this power
is that the state action cannot be arbitrary.5 Does the charter provision
in the principal case meet this minimum standard of due process? It can
be construed to require either (I) that a conclusive presumption of unfitness be drawn from a refusal to testify, or (2) that the employee testify as
a condition of retaining his public employment. I£ the petitioners had
admitted actual membership in a proscribed organization, this would not
have created a conclusive presumption of unfitness under New York's
Feinberg Law6 since the fact of membership creates only prima facie
evidence of unfitness, rebuttable at a hearing required by that statute.7
1 "If any . . . employee • . . having appeared [before any legislative committee]
shall refuse . . • to answer any question • • • on the ground that his answer would
tend to incriminate him, • • . his . . • employment shall terminate • . • and he shall
not be eligible . . • to any office or employment under the city. . . ." N.Y. City
Charter (Tanzer, 1937) §903.
2 Faxon v. School Committee, (Mass. 1954) 120 N.E. (2d) 772; Board of Education
v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App. (2d) 100, 270 P. (2d) 82 (1954); Board of Education v.
Eisenberg, (Cal. App.1954) 277 P. (2d) 943 (reasons for refusing to testify held immaterial).
a Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 564, 92 P. (2d) 416 (1939);
McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892); Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn.
105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). Contra, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923).
4 E.g., Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195, 36 S.Ct. 85 (1915).
~But see Byse, "Teachers and the Fifth Amendment," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 871
(1954).
616 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1953) §3022.
7 These factors were held to satisfy the requirements of due process in Adler· v.
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 at 495-496, 72 S.Ct. 380 (1952).
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While the charter in the principal case is not expressly framed in terms
of presumptions, in practical operation it authorizes a conclusive presumption of unfitness to be inferred from a refusal to testify.8 Conclusive
presumptions which preclude the affected party from presenting evidence
in his own defense have frequently been struck down as arbitrary in
nature.9
In addition, the terms of the charter in the principal case condition
the grant of the privilege of public employment upon the surrender by
the employee of his constitutional privilege. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has not, however, prevented states from imposing on the
privilege of public employment conditions which would be invalid in
other contex.ts.10 But such conditions may restrict only those constitutional
rights which, when exercised, conflict with the duties of public employment.11 Control over public employment includes not only the right to
dismiss disloyal employees, but also the right to prescribe that certain acts
by the employee shall be considered, as a matter of policy, a sufficient
indication of disloyalty to justify dismissal. Thus, Garner v. Board of
Public Works12 upheld an ordinance which required the dismissal, on
loyalty grounds, of any employee who refused to execute an affidavit respecting affiliation with the Communist Party. A city should also be able
to prescribe that the assertion of the privilege before a committee is sufficient indication of disloyalty to warrant dismissal. The essential distinction
between the Garner case and the principal case, however, is that the dismissed employee in the Garner case could later execute the affidavit and
be re-employed. A dismissal, when accompanied by a denial of re-employment for years or for life, has been condemned as "punishment, and of
a most severe type." 13 Wieman v. Updegraff,14 although decided on the
s A statute operating in a similar way was held invalid in Matter of Peck v. Cargill,
167 N.Y. 391, 60 N.E. 775 (1901).
9 Mobile, J. &: K.. C. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 31 S.Ct. 136 (1910); Manley
v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 49 S.Ct. 215 (1929); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct.
215 (1952).
l0Houghton v. School Committee, 306 Mass. 542, 28 N.E. (2d) 1001 (1940); Joyce
v. Board of Education, 325 Ill. App. 543, 60 N.E. (2d) 431 (1945); School City of East
Chicago v. Sigler, 219 Ind. 9, 36 N.E. (2d) 760 (1941). By rejecting both the unions'
contention of unconstitutional condition and the . government's contention of mere
"privilege," the Douds case may indicate that this doctrine is inapplicable to regulations
under a separate power (e.g., interstate commerce or public employment) as opposed
to regulations by authority of the police power. American Communications Assn. v.
Douds,.339 U.S. 382 at 389-390, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950).
11 A police officer's refusal to answer is inconsistent with his duty to detect and
prevent crime. In Faxon v. School Committee, note 2 supra, the court found a similar
inconsistency between the teacher's duty in the public school system and his refusal
to answer questions concerning communism.
12 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951).
13 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 at 316, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946). In Bailey v.
Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. {2d) 46, affd. by an equally divided court, 341 U.S.
918, 71 S.Ct. 669 (1951), proscription of a dismissed employee from re-employment for
three years was held void. The three year bar was an individual judgment in this case.
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narrower issue of indiscriminate
classification of innocent with knowing
f
activity, did indicate that there are constitutional rights which will protect
the public from employee arbitrary dismissal.15 Although the city may
properly dismiss an employee who refuses to make the required disclosures,
provisions which create a conclusive presumption of unfitness and which
permanently bar the employee from public employment are open to attack
as an arbitrary exercise of power and hence invalid as a denial of due
process.
John B. Huck, S.Ed.

The court indicated that the order might have been valid had it been a general order
covering all cases.
:14 Note 9 supra, at 191, 192.
15 See also ·Alston v. School Board, (4th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 992, in which such
a constitutional right was protected in spite of the contention that public employment
is only a privilege.

